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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue:1 Does the contract between Salt Lake City 
Corporation and Projects Unlimited clearly and unequivocally show 
that Projects Unlimited agreed to indemnify the City for the City's 
own negligence? 
Standard of Review: Where, as here, the trial court 
interprets a contract as a matter of law, its construction is 
reviewed for correctness and is accorded no particular weight. 
See, e.g., Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations. 
1
 Projects Unlimited takes no position on the other issue 
raised in the City's appeal, namely, whether the City was immune 
from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-30-1 through -38. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover for personal 
injuries he suffered while working on a maintenance building at the 
Salt Lake City International Airport. Record (lfR.,f) at 2-5. 
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") filed a third-
party complaint against the plaintiff's employer, Projects 
Unlimited, seeking indemnity under its written contract with 
Projects Unlimited. Id. at 62-69. 
Projects Unlimited moved for summary judgment on the 
third-party complaint on the grounds that Projects Unlimited had 
not agreed to indemnify the City for the City's own negligence. 
Id. at 100-124. The City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
based on its interpretation of the contract. Id. at 131-50. The 
trial court granted Projects Unlimited's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the City's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Id. at 181. 
The case went to trial on the plaintiff's claims against 
the defendants. The jury found that the plaintiff, the City and 
Projects Unlimited were all negligent and that their negligence had 
proximately caused the plaintiff to be injured in the amount of 
$186,200. Id. at 195-98. The jury apportioned fault as follows: 
Plaintiff James Ericksen 10% 
Defendant Salt Lake City 50% 
Projects Unlimited 40% 
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Id. at 197. A judgment on the jury's special verdict was entered 
against the City and Salt Lake Airport Authority and in favor of 
the plaintiff in the amount of $94,892, representing the City's 
share of the verdict—50 percent of the plaintiff's special damages 
plus prejudgment interest and 50 percent of the plaintiff's general 
damages. Jd. at 266-72. A separate Order and Judgment was entered 
against the City and in favor of Projects Unlimited on the City's 
third-party complaint. Id. at 262-65. The defendants then filed 
a notice of appeal, id. at 275-76, and the plaintiff cross-
appealed, id. at 277-79. 
B. Statement of Facts2 
1. On or about April 9, 1986, the City entered into an 
Agreement with Projects Unlimited for the construction of an 
airport maintenance facility. R. at 119-24. 
2. Article 15 of the Agreement provides as follows: 
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor 
[Projects Unlimited] agrees to at all times 
protect, indemnify, save ha[r]mless and defend 
the City, its agents and employees from any 
and all claims, demands, judgments, expenses, 
incl[ud]ing reasonable attorney's fees, and 
all other damages of every kind and nature 
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf of 
2
 The statement of facts is taken from Projects Unlimited's 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. See R. 
at 104-05. The City did not dispute any of Projects Unlimited's 
facts as required by rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Judicial Council Rules 
of Judicial Administration but expressly accepted them and 
incorporated them into its memorandum in support of its cross-
motion for summary judgment. See R. at 134. The trial court 
therefore properly deemed the material facts undisputed. 
- 3 -
any person or persons whomsoever, including 
the parties hereto and their employees, which 
may arise out of any act or failure to act, 
work or other activity related in any way to 
the project, by the said Contractor, its 
agents. subcontractors, materialmen or 
employees in the performance and execution of 
this Agreement. 
R. at 122 (emphasis added). (A copy of the Agreement is included 
in the Addendum.) 
3. On or about March 5, 1987, the plaintiff, James D. 
Ericksen, was employed by Projects Unlimited and was working on the 
maintenance facility at the Salt Lake City Airport. Ericksen was 
standing on a ladder near an automatically controlled door when an 
inspector for the City opened the door, dislodging the ladder and 
causing Ericksen to fall to the cement floor. See id. at 3-4 & 8 
5 1; Transcript, Mar. 6, 1991 (R. at 289), pp. 10-11. 
4. Pursuant to Utah's workers' compensation statute, 
Projects Unlimited paid benefits to Ericksen through workers' 
compensation awards. See Deposition of James Ericksen (R. at 288)
 # 
pp. 21-22. 
5. Ericksen filed this lawsuit against the City and 
Salt Lake Airport Authority alleging negligence by the City. R. at 
3-4 H 7-8. 
6. The City filed a Third Party Complaint against 
Projects Unlimited claiming, among other things, that Projects 
Unlimited was required pursuant to article 15 of the parties' 
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Agreement to indemnify the City from any judgment in favor of 
Ericksen. Id. at 62-64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, the City can only be liable to the 
plaintiff for the City's own negligence. (Point I.) Moreover, 
under Utah law, Projects Unlimited can only be liable to the City 
to the extent it clearly and unequivocally agreed to indemnify the 
City. (Point II.) Because Projects Unlimited did not clearly and 
unequivocally agree to indemnify the City for the City's own 
negligence—which is the only liability the City can have on the 
plaintiff's complaint—Projects Unlimited cannot be liable to the 
City on the City's third-party complaint. (Point III.) 
Finally, if Ericksen is successful on his cross-appeal, 
at best the City would only be entitled to a new trial. The court 
cannot determine the parties' rights and obligations on the City's 
third-party complaint from the jury's verdict in this case since 
Projects Unlimited is not bound by that verdict. (Point IV.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CITY CAN ONLY BE LIABLE TO ERICKSEN FOR ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
The Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 
through -43 (1987), governs the parties' respective rights and 
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liabilities in this case,3 The Act expressly limits a defendant's 
liability to the percentage of fault attributable to that 
defendant. Section 78-27-38 states that a plaintiff "may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his 
own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault 
attributable to that defendant.11 (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, section 78-27-40 says that "the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery 
is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." 
Thus, if the City is ultimately held liable to Ericksen 
at all, it can only be for the City's own fault. 
II. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED CAN BE LIABLE TO THE CITY ONLY TO THE EXTENT 
IT AGREED TO INDEMNIFY THE CITY. 
Under the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988), the statutory 
employer of an injured employee has no liability to third persons 
on account of the employee's injuries, and no action at law can be 
3
 The Liability Reform Act applies to actions for injuries 
that occurred after its effective date of April 28, 1986. See 
Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 954-55 (Utah 1987). Ericksen 
was injured on March 5, 1987. 
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maintained against the employer based upon the employee's 
injuries.4 See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 793 P.2d 362, 370 
(Utah 1990). Thus, as a general rule, a third party, such as the 
City, has no claim for indemnity against a statutory employer, such 
as Projects Unlimited, for amounts the third party is required to 
pay in an action by an injured employee, such as Ericksen. 
An employer, however, can waive the protections of the 
Workers' Compensation Act by expressly agreeing to indemnify a 
third party for amounts paid to its employee. Id. at 368, 370; 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 
1191 (Utah 1983). In this case, Projects Unlimited expressly 
Section 35-1-60 states: 
The right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee . . . shall 
be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer and 
the liabilities of the employer imposed by 
this act shall be in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever, at common 
law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, 
next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, 
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on 
account of any accident or injury or death, in 
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer or against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer based upon any 
accident, injury or death of an employee. 
- 7 
agreed, in article 15 of its contract with the City, to indemnify 
the City for certain claims. Thus, the issue here is whether that 
agreement to indemnify is broad enough to cover the plaintiff's 
recovery against the City. 
III. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED DID NOT CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY AGREE TO 
INDEMNIFY THE CITY FOR THE CITY'S OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
The jury in this case found the City responsible for 50 
percent of the negligence that proximately caused the accident, and 
the trial court accordingly limited the plaintiff's recovery 
against the City to 50 percent of the plaintiff's damages, as it 
was required to do under the Liability Reform Act. See R. at 268-
69, 271; see also supra pt. I. Since Ericksen was only allowed to 
recover from the City that proportion of his damages attributable 
to the City's fault, the only issue on appeal is whether Projects 
Unlimited agreed to indemnify the City for the City's own 
negligence, the only liability the City has. 
"Agreements by which one person obtains another person's 
agreement to indemnify him from the results of his own negligence 
are not favorites of the law . . . and are strictly construed 
against the indemnitee." Shell, 658 P.2d at 1189 (citations 
omitted). See also Freund, 793 P.2d at 370 ("In a long line of 
cases spanning more than fifty years, we have repeatedly held that 
an indemnity agreement which purports to make a party respond for 
the negligence of another should be strictly construed") (citations 
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omitted). A party will be held to have contractually assumed 
ultimate financial responsibility for another's negligence only 
when its intention to do so is "clearly and unequivocally 
expressed" in the contract language. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370; 
Shell, 658 P.2d at 1189. 
The contract language in this case does not clearly and 
unequivocally show any intent on the part of Projects Unlimited to 
indemnify the City for the City's own negligence. The relevant 
provision states: 
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor 
[Projects Unlimited] agrees to at all times 
protect, indemnify, save ha[r]mless and defend 
the City, its agents and employees from any 
and all claims, demands, judgments, expenses, 
incl[ud]ing reasonable attorney's fees, and 
all other damages of every kind and nature 
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf of 
any person or persons whomsoever, including 
the parties hereto and their employees, which 
may arise out of any act or failure to act, 
work or other activity related in any way to 
the project, by the said Contractor, its 
agents, subcontractors, materialmen or 
employees in the performance and execution of 
this Agreement. 
R. at 122 (emphasis added). 
The underlined phrase modifies the phrase "any and all 
claims, demands, judgments, expenses, . . . and all other damages 
of every kind and nature" and limits the category of claims against 
which Projects Unlimited will indemnify the City. Projects 
Unlimited only agreed to indemnify the City for claims arising out 
of the acts or omissions of Projects Unlimited and its agents. 
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subcontractors, employees and materialmen related to the project— 
not the acts or omissions of the City, See Westinghouse Elec. 
Elevator Co, v. La Salle Monroe Bldq. Corp,, 395 111. 429, 70 
N.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1946) (construing similar language).5 
The City would have the court read the phrase "by the 
said Contractor, its agents, subcontractors, materialmen or 
employees" out of the contract. But the court must give effect to 
every provision of the contract, insofar as possible, including the 
quoted language. See, e.g., Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. Co., 
614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). And the quoted language clearly 
limits the circumstances under which Projects Unlimited agreed to 
indemnify the City to claims based on the negligence of Projects 
Unlimited and those under it.6 
5
 The indemnity provision in Westinahouse covered claims 
"arising out of any acts or omissions by the Contractor, his 
agents, servants or employes in the course of any work done in 
connection with any of the matters set out in these 
specifications." 70 N.E.2d at 606. The court found this language 
"plain and unambiguous." Id. "[B]y such language the agreement to 
indemnify . . . was specifically limited to acts or omissions by 
[the contractor], its agents, servants or employees. Any other 
construction would require the addition of words not used and add 
thereto conditions and terms about which the contract is silent." 
Id, at 607. 
6
 Even if the contract language could conceivably be 
construed as an agreement to indemnify the City for the City's own 
negligence, when strictly construed against the City, as it must 
be, see Shell, 658 P.2d at 1189, the language clearly limits 
Projects Unlimited's liability to claims arising out of its own 
negligence or the fault of its agents, employees, subcontractors 
and materialmen—not the fault of the City. Moreover, the 
Agreement was on the City's printed form, see R. at 119-24 & 
Addendum, so any ambiguity in the Agreement should be construed 
against the City, the drafter of the Agreement. See, e.g., Sears 
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Despite the clear language of the agreement, the City 
argues that, based on the agreements that this court found 
sufficient in Freund and Shell, article 15 is broad enough to cover 
any and all liabilities, including the City's liability for its own 
negligence. 
The agreement in this case differs significantly from the 
agreements that this court has upheld as clear and unequivocal 
expressions of the indemnitor's intent to indemnify the indemnitee 
for the indemnitee's own negligence. 
In Freund, for example, the court examined a very 
extensive and exhaustive indemnification provision.7 The provision 
V. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982); Parks Enters.. Inc. 
v. New Century Realty. Inc.. 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982). 
7
 The relevant provision read as follows: 
21. Licensee shall indemnify, protect, and save 
harmless Licensor from and against any and all claims, 
demands, causes of action, costs or other liabilities for 
damages to property and injury or death to persons which 
may arise out of or be connected with the erection, 
maintenance, presence, use or removal of Licensee's 
equipment, or of structures, guys and anchors, used, 
installed or placed for the principal purpose of 
supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act of Licensee 
on or in the vicinity of Licensor's poles, including, but 
not by way of limitation, payments made under workmen's 
compensation laws. Except for intentional wrongdoing or 
willful negligence on the part of Licensor, or any of its 
agents or employees, Licensee shall also indemnify 
protect and save harmless Licensor from and against any 
and all claims, demands, causes of action, costs, or 
other liabilities arising from any interruption, 
discontinuance or interference with Licensee's service 
which may be occasioned or which may be claimed to have 
been occasioned by any action of Licensor pursuant to or 
consistent with this agreement. In addition, Licensee 
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stated that the indemnitee would indemnify, protect and save 
harmless the indemnitor from and against "any and all claims, 
demands, causes of action, costs or other liabilities." The 
provision further stated that it was meant to provide the 
indemnitee with "full and complete indemnification" from any claims 
for damages. Given these provisions, the court found that the lack 
of an express agreement to indemnify the indemnitee for his own 
negligence was not fatal: "the broad sweep of the language 
employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in which the 
[indemnitee] may be negligent." 793 P.2d at 371. In particular, 
the word "liabilities" was broad enough to cover "those instances 
where the [indemnitee] is legally liable for damages, including 
shall, upon demand and at its own sole risk and expense, 
defend any and all suits, actions or other legal 
proceedings which may be brought or instituted by third 
persons against Licensor or their successors or assigns 
on any such claim, demand or cause of action; shall pay 
and satisfy any said suit, action or other legal 
proceeding; and shall reimburse Licensor for any and all 
reasonable legal expenses incurred by Licensor in 
connection herewith. 
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor 
of Licensor, shall provide Licensor with full and 
complete indemnification, including defense of any suits, 
actions or other legal proceedings resulting from any 
claims for damages to property and injury or death to 
persons and shall apply to all claims, demands, suits, 
and judgments of whatever nature which shall be made or 
assessed against Licensor in furnishing such poles under 
the terms of this agreement or for any other thing done 
or omitted in conjunction with Licensor's dealings with 
Licensee. 
Quoted in Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 625 F. Supp. 272, 276-
77 (D. Utah 1985). 
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those where liability arises because of the [indemnitee's] 
negligence." Id. 
Moreover, the indemnity provision in Freund stated that 
it "shall apply to all claims" against the indemnitee including 
claims "for any . . . thing done or omitted in conjunction with 
[the indemnitee's] dealings with [the indemnitor]." The agreement 
also stated that, "[e]xcept for intentional wrongdoing or willful 
negligence on the part of" the indemnitee, the indemnitor "shall 
also indemnify[,] protect and save harmless [the indemnitee] from 
and against any and all claims . . . arising from any . . . 
interference with [the indemnitor's] service which may be 
occasioned or which may be claimed to have been occasioned by any 
action of [the indemnitee] pursuant to or consistent with this 
agreement." Thus, the agreement expressly covered at least some 
actions of the indemnitee and expressly excluded only willful and 
intentional wrongdoing by the indemnitee. 
The court concluded that the provision "as a whole 
expressed a clear and unequivocal intent by the parties" that the 
indemnitor would indemnify the indemnitee from any and all 
liabilities, including any liability for the indemnitee's own 
negligence. Id. 
The provision in this case is much more modest than—and 
quite different from—the provision in Freund. Unlike the 
provision in Freund, the provision in this case does not expressly 
indemnify the City for "any and all . • . liabilities." In fact, 
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the only reference to liabilities at all is in the heading to 
article 15—"Liability"—which apparently is a reference to 
Projects Unlimited7s obligation to indemnify the City and not to 
any liability on the part of the City. 
Nor does the indemnification provision in this case 
expressly cover some conduct by the City while expressly excepting 
intentional or willful conduct. 
Most important, the indemnification provision in Freund 
covered any and all claims and suits and did not limit the 
indemnification to acts by the indemnitor or those under him, as 
article 15 of the agreement in this case does. 
Similarly, the indemnification provision in Shell 
expressly excluded claims resulting from the indemnitee's "sole 
negligence" but did not expressly exclude other claims based on the 
indemnitee's negligence.8 The court could therefore infer that the 
* The provision read, in relevant part: 
. . . Contractor agrees to protect, indemnify and 
save Operator, its employees, and agents harmless from 
and against all claims, demands and causes of action of 
every kind and character arising in favor of Contractor's 
employees, Operator's employees or third parties on 
account of bodily injuries, death or damage to property 
arising out of or in connection with the performance of 
this agreement, except where such injury, death or damage 
has resulted from the sole negligence of Operator, 
without negligence or willful act on the part of 
Contractor, its agents, servants, employees, or 
subcontractors. Contractor shall defend all suits 
brought upon such claims and pay all costs and expenses 
incidental thereto, but Operator shall have the right, at 
its option, to participate in the defense of any such 
suit without relieving Contractor of any obligation 
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parties did not intend to exclude such claims. Here, on the other 
hand, there is no basis for such an inference because the 
indemnification provision is silent as to claims based on the 
indemnitee's negligence. 
Moreover, the indemnification provision in Shell did not 
limit the indemnitor's liability to claims arising out of the 
indemnitor's acts or omissions, as the agreement in this case does. 
Thus, neither Freund nor Shell—the two Utah cases the 
City relies on—is controlling. The language of the indemnity 
provisions in each of those cases was substantially different from 
the language of the indemnity provision in this case. 
In a lengthy footnote, the City also cites cases from 
other jurisdictions. But those cases, like Freund and Shell, all 
involved different contract language and are thus distinguishable. 
In one of the cases, the contract expressly covered indemnity for 
injuries due to the negligence of the owner. See Rovnak v. Union 
Carbide Corp., Linde Piv.. 64 A.D.2d 839, 407 N.Y.S.2d 323, 323-24 
(1978). In another, the contractor had agreed to indemnify the 
owner from any liability or damages arising out of or resulting 
from the presence of the contractor's employees on the owner's 
premises, and an employee of the contractor was injured while he 
was on the owner's premises. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. J.U. 
hereunder. 
Quoted in 658 P.2d at 1189 n.l. 
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Schickli & Bros,, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Ky. 1977). In each of 
the remaining cases, the contract language covered claims or 
injuries "incident to," "arising out of" or occurring "in 
connection with" the work. See Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren 
Petroleum Corp. , 316 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1963) (indemnity 
provision covered any claim "which arises out of or in connection 
with the activities of Contractor, Contractor's servants, agents 
and employees") (applying Texas law); Richmond v. Amoco Prod. Co., 
390 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (E.D. Tex. 1975) (contract made contractor 
liable for claims for injuries "incident to or arising out of, the 
performance of this contract") (applying Texas law), aff'd. 532 
F.2d 1373 & 1374 (5th Cir. 1976) (table); Buffa v. General Motors 
Corp., 131 F. Supp. 478, 481 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (contractor assumed 
risk of injuries "resulting from any action or operation under the 
contract or in connection with the work") (applying Michigan law); 
Gust K. Newberg Constr. Co. v. Fischbach, Moore & Morrissey, Inc., 
46 111. App. 2d 238, 196 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1964) (agreement to 
indemnify for injuries "caused by, resulting from, arising out of, 
or occurring in connection with the execution of the Work provided 
for in this Contract"); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Kopp. 121 
N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (agreement to indemnify for 
injuries "growing out of or in any way connected with the 
performance of the work awarded to Contractor"); Crews Well Serv. 
v. Texas Co.. 358 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.) (agreement to 
indemnify for injuries "arising out of or in connection with the 
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performance of said work"), writ refused, n.r.e,, 360 S.W.2d 873 
(Tex. 1962). Under such provisions, the only requirement is that 
the injury have some connection with the contractor's work. Alamo 
Lumber, 316 F.3d at 290. It does not have to arise out of some act 
or failure to act "by the . . . Contractor," as in this case. Cf. 
Buffa, 131 F. Supp. at 482 (expressly distinguishing cases such as 
this one in which the contract limits indemnity to injuries arising 
from any action of the contractor) . Other courts have also 
distinguished agreements to indemnify a contractee for injuries 
arising out of or incidental to performance of the work from 
agreements to indemnify the contractee for injuries arising out of 
the acts or omissions of the contractor. See, e.g., Spurr v. Acme 
Steel Co., 238 F. Supp. 606, 607-08 (N.D. 111. 1964), aff'd, 385 
F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1967); Daiale v. Lang, 377 So.2d 1384, 1390-91 
(La. Ct. App. 1979), cert, denied, 381 So.2d 510 (La. 1980). 
In none of the cases the City relies on did the contract 
limit the contractor's duty to indemnify to claims arising out of 
acts or omissions by the contractor, its agents, subcontractors, 
materialmen and employees, as the contract in this case does.9 
9
 In Richmond the contractor's duty to indemnify the owner 
for injuries to the owner's employees or to third parties was so 
limited. That language would not have been enough to hold the 
contractor liable had the injured party been a third party, see 390 
F. Supp. at 676, but the injured party there, as here, was an 
employee of the contractor, and the contract provision covering the 
contractor's duty to indemnify the owner for injuries to the 
contractor's own employees did not say that the injury must have 
arisen out of the negligence of the contractor, see id. at 674-75, 
676. 
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And, in fact, the vast majority of the cases that have considered 
language similar to that of the indemnity provision in this case 
have concluded that such language does not require the contractor 
to indemnify an owner for the owners own active negligence. See, 
e.g. , United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1970) 
(contract making contractor responsible for all damages "that occur 
as a result of his fault or negligence" did not require the 
contractor to indemnify the owner for the owner's negligence) 
(applying federal law); Smith v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 1154, 
1156-57 (5th Cir. 1975) (agreement by which contractor agreed to 
indemnify owner from any claim "in any way arising out of or 
connected with the performance by Contractor of services hereunder" 
"unquestionably does not provide for indemnification for the 
indemnitee's own negligence in the clear and specific language 
required by Louisiana law") (citations omitted); Cole v. Chevron 
Chem. Cc—Oronite Div. v. Mechanical Contracting Eng'rs, Inc., 477 
F.2d 361, 367-69 (5th Cir.) (accord) (applying Louisiana law), 
cert, denied, 414 U.S. 978 (1973); Fowler v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 
739 F. Supp. 671, 673-75 (D. Me. 1990) (agreement to indemnify 
owner for any claim "resulting from, pertaining to or arising out 
of performance of this Contract by Contractor, its employees, 
agents, assigns or subcontractors" did not cover claims for the 
owner's own negligence) (applying Maine law), aff'd, F.2d 
(1st Cir. Oct. 29, 1991) (1991 Westlaw 217303); Colombo v. Republic 
Steel Corp. , 448 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (agreement to 
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indemnify owner for claims "by reason of acts or omissions b> 
[contractor], its agents or employees, in the execution of its 
contractual obligations" did not cover a loss due to the owner's 
own negligence) (applying Pennsylvania law); District of Columbia 
v, C.F.&B., Inc.. 442 F. Supp. 251, 254 (D.D.C. 1977) (contractor's 
agreement to be responsible for injuries "that occur as a result of 
any act or omission of the contractor in connection with the 
prosecution of the work" did not cover injuries caused by the 
owner's negligence); Westinahouse Elec. Elevator Co, v. La Salle 
Monroe Bldcr, Corp,, 395 111. 429, 70 N.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1946) 
(agreement to indemnify owner for claims "arising out of any acts 
or omissions by the Contractor, his agents, servants or employes ir 
the course of any work done in connection with" the contract die 
not cover claims caused by the negligence of the owner's employee); 
Kaspar v. Clinton-Jackson Corp.. 118 111. App. 2d 364, 254 N.E.2c 
826, 830 (1969) (contractor's agreement to assume liability for 
injuries "caused by or resulting from or arriving [sic] out of an} 
act or omission on the part of the Contractor in connection with 
this Agreement or for the prosecution of the work hereunder" die 
not provide indemnity for the owner's own negligence); Employers 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis, v. Griffin Constr. Co.. 280 S.W.2d 179, 
183 (Ky. 1955) (agreement to indemnify owner for claims for 
injuries "happening by reason of any negligence on the part of the 
Contractor or any of Contractor's agents or employees" did not 
cover damages that occurred by reason of the owner's own 
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negligence); Strickland v. Nutt. 264 So.2d 317, 322-23 (La. Ct. 
App.) (agreement to indemnify owner against any and all liability 
for injuries "incident to or resulting from any and all operations 
performed by [contractor] under any of the terms of this contract" 
did not indemnify the owner for its negligence), writ refused, 262 
La. 1124, 266 So.2d 432 (1972); Buford v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of 
New Orleans. 175 So. 110, 112 (La. Ct. App. 1937) (agreement to 
protect owner from injuries received "by or from said Contractor, 
his servants or agents in the construction of said work . . . or by 
or on account of any act or omission of the said Contractor or his 
agents" did not indemnify the owner against the consequences of its 
own negligence); Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 
320 Md. 584, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206-07 (1990) (agreement to indemnify 
owner for any liability "resulting from or arising out of or in 
connection with the performance of this contract by Contractor" did 
not indemnify the owner against its own negligence); Kansas City 
Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp., 351 S.W.2d 741, 745-46 
(Mo. 1961) (agreement to indemnify owner for claims "resulting from 
or arising out of the acts or omissions of the Contractor, or any 
sub-contractor, their respective servants, agents, and employees" 
did not indemnify the owner against the results of its own 
negligence); Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp.f 290 N.Y. 145, 
48 N.E.2d 299, 303 (1943) (agreement to indemnify owner for damages 
"due to any act or omission of the Contractor, his employees or 
agents, arising out of the work of the Contractor" did not cover 
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injuries due to the owner's active negligence); Morton v. Union 
Traction Co, . 20 Pa. Super, 325, 335-37 (1902) (agreement to 
indemnify owner for claims for injuries received "by or from the 
said contractor . . . or by or on account of any act or omission of 
the said contractor or his agents" did not require the contractor 
to indemnify the owner for its own negligence); Humble Oil & 
Refining Co. v. Wilson, 339 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) 
("where the indemnity is from loss resulting from the indemnitor's 
'negligent acts or omissions,' the dominant weight of authority 
establishes that the agreement does not cover loss where the 
indemnitee's negligence concurs in causing the injury") (citation 
omitted); Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 84 Wash. 429, 
147 P. 2, 3 (1915) (agreement to indemnify owner for losses caused 
by "any act or omission done or suffered to be done by the said 
contractor, its agents, servants, employes, or subcontractors in 
the performance of said contract" did not protect the owner from 
losses caused by its own negligence). 
In short, a strict construction of the indemnification 
provision in this case does not show a clear and unequivocal 
intention on the part of Projects Unlimited to indemnify the City 
from liability for the City's own negligence, and the cases 
construing similar indemnity agreements do not support the City's 
claim. The Agreement limits the indemnification to the acts of 
Projects Unlimited, its agents, employees, subcontractors and 
materialmen. Because the City has no liability to Ericksen for 
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claims arising from others' actions, it also has no claim against 
Projects Unlimited for indemnity. 
IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE CITY ON ITS THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT EVEN IF ERICKSEN IS 
SUCCESSFUL ON HIS CROSS-APPEAL. 
Ericksen (the plaintiff and Projects Unlimited's 
employee) has cross-appealed, claiming that Projects Unlimited 
should not have been listed on the Special Verdict form. Projects 
Unlimited takes no position on that issue. In the closing 
paragraph of its brief, however, the City argues that, if the court 
grants Ericksen judgment on his cross-appeal for damages against 
Salt Lake City in amounts attributable to the negligence of 
Projects Unlimited, then Projects Unlimited should be required to 
indemnify the City for those amounts. Brief of Appellants Salt 
Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake Airport Authority at 21. 
The City's argument is wrong for four reasons. 
First, under the Liability Reform Act, the City cannot be 
liable for Projects Unlimited's negligence. See supra pt. I. 
Ericksen cannot recover from the City any amount attributable to 
the negligence of Projects Unlimited. And, because Projects 
Unlimited did not clearly and unequivocally agree to indemnify the 
City for the City's own negligence, Projects Unlimited cannot be 
liable to the City regardless of the court's decision on Ericksen's 
cross-appeal. 
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Second, the City assumes that, if Ericksen prevails on 
his cross-appeal, this court can simply order the entry of a 
judgment based on the jury's findings as to the parties' respective 
proportions of fault. However, if Ericksen is right that Projects 
Unlimited should not have been listed on the verdict form, then the 
case should be remanded for a new trial on Ericksen's claim against 
the City, since the court cannot say how the jury would have 
apportioned fault among Ericksen and the City had Projects 
Unlimited not been listed on the verdict form. 
Third, even if the City could somehow be liable to 
Ericksen for Projects Unlimited's negligence and this court could 
simply remand the case for entry of an increased judgment in favor 
of Ericksen, the jury's apportionment of fault among Ericksen, the 
City and Projects Unlimited would not be binding on Projects 
Unlimited since Projects Unlimited did not have an opportunity to 
defend itself at trial. A party, such as the City, who has 
litigated an issue cannot assert a judgment against another who did 
not have the opportunity to litigate the issue. See, e.g., Nielson 
v. Droubav. 652 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982); Ruffinenao v. Miller, 
579 P.2d 342, 3-43-44 (Utah 1978). Projects Unlimited was granted 
summary judgment before trial and therefore did not participate in 
the trial. Thus, it cannot be bound by the jury's finding as to 
its negligence. If it had had an opportunity to defend itself at 
trial, the jury may not have apportioned any fault to Projects 
Unlimited. 
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Finally, the City's argument proceeds from a false 
premise. The City assumes that, if Projects Unlimited is not 
included in the verdict form, the jury must assign Projects 
Unlimited's negligence to one of the other parties. Presumably, 
the argument goes as follows: The jury must determine 100 percent 
of the fault that caused the accident. It then must apportion that 
total fault among those listed on the verdict form. If Projects 
Unlimited is removed from the form, the only way the jury can reach 
an apportionment that totals 100 percent is by attributing Projects 
Unlimited's fault, if any, to either Ericksen or the City. Because 
Projects Unlimited agreed to indemnify the City for Projects 
Unlimited's negligence, Projects Unlimited would then have to 
indemnify the City to the extent its negligence was attributed to 
the City. 
There are two flaws in this argument. First, nothing in 
the Liability Reform Act requires the jury to determine all of the 
causes of the plaintiff's injuries and to apportion fault among 
them all. Rather, the act simply requires the jury to "find 
separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages 
sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to 
each person seeking recovery and to each defendant." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-3? (emphasis added). In other words, if the jury is 
properly instructed, it will simply compare the fault of those 
listed on the verdict form, not the fault of all tortfeasors, 
absent or otherwise. It will not have to apportion or even 
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consider any fault of a so-called phantom tortfeasor, that is, one 
who is not a defendant and thus not listed on the verdict form. So 
even if the jury's apportionment of fault totals 100 percent, that 
does not necessarily mean that the jury has apportioned absent 
tortfeasors' fault to the parties listed on the verdict form. If 
the court instructs the jury in the language of the Liability 
Reform Act and the jury returns a verdict finding the plaintiff, 
for example, 33 percent at fault and the defendant 67 percent at 
fault, that does not mean that the defendant was responsible for 67 
percent of the total fault that caused the plaintiff's injuries. 
It simply means that the defendant was twice as much at fault as 
the plaintiff was. Other parties not listed on the verdict form 
may have been more at fault than either. But that does not mean 
that the fault of the absent parties must have been attributed to 
the defendant. 
The second flaw in the City's reasoning is that nothing 
in the Liability Reform Act requires the jury's apportionment of 
fault to total 100 percent. The court can simply ask the jury: "Of 
the total fault that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, 
what percentage or proportion is attributable to the plaintiff, and 
what percentage or proportion is attributable to the City?" To the 
extent the jury's apportionment does not total 100 percent, the 
difference will presumably be the fault of third persons. 
If the City's premise were correct, it would violate both 
the letter and the spirit of the Liability Reform Act. If, for 
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example, the jury were instructed to apportion the total fault that 
caused the plaintiff's injuries but only among those listed on the 
verdict form, the jury would have to apportion phantom tortfeasors' 
fault to one of the parties listed on the form, in violation of the 
requirement that no defendant be liable for more than his share of 
fault. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 & -40. In fact, under the 
City's reasoning, the jury would have to apportion fault twice. 
First, it would have to apportion fault between Ericksen and the 
City. Then it would have to apportion fault a second time, between 
the City and Projects Unlimited. That is, it would have to answer 
the question, "Of the total fault that you have attributed to the 
City, what percentage is really attributable to Projects Unlimited 
and not to the City?" Simply to ask the question is to show the 
absurdity of such a system. If the City's reasoning were right, 
then the court would have to assume that, when it instructed the 
jury to state the percentage of fault attributable to the City, the 
jury would disregard the instruction and apportion to the City the 
negligence of third parties. 
In short, if the court concludes that Projects Unlimited 
was improperly listed on the verdict form, it should remand the 
case for a new trial. But even then the City can only be liable 
for its own fault. Since Projects Unlimited did not agree to 
indemnify the City for the City's own fault, Projects Unlimited 
cannot be liable to the City even if Ericksen is successful on his 
cross-appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor 
of Projects Unlimited and against the City on the City's third-
party complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED this J5 7* day of November, 1991. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
J4-
IUCE (r. 
BRUCE (T. JONES, ESQ. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Third Judicial District 
- MAR 0 8 1991 
lib^.y Clerk, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY, 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-637 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third-Party Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Pro-
jects"), brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third-Party 
Complaint of Salt Lake City Corporation against Projects, request-
ing that the Court grant judgment in favor of Projects. Salt 
oy;;i8 
Lake City Corporation brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Projects. 
Projects moved the Court on the grounds that the ex-
press language of the construction Agreement dated April 9, 1986, 
between the parties, and in particular ARTICLE 15 contained 
therein respecting indemnification, does not extend to allega-
tions of Salt Lake City's own negligence. Pursuant to Utah's 
Comparative Negligence provisions, the plaintiff can only recover 
from Salt Lake City in this action the amount of damages equiva-
lent to the proportion of fault attributable to Salt Lake City.* 
As a consequence of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,2 where 
the plaintiff has brought an action alleging negligence by Salt 
Lake City in a job-related injury, the potential liability of 
Projects (the former employer of plaintiff at the time of the 
injury) to Salt Lake City, if any, can only arise from a contract 
of indemnification wherein Projects clearly and unequivocally 
agrees to indemnify Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own 
negligence. Salt Lake City, and indirectly the plaintiff, cannot 
recover from Projects except where Projects has clearly and 
unequivocally waived the bar afforded Projects by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. Salt Lake City cannot here maintain a third-
party action against Projects because there is no clear and 
1
 Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-40 (1986), as amended. 
2 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended. 
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002 
unequivocal indemnification expressed in the Agreement between 
the parties whereby Projects indemnifies or agrees to defend 
Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own negligence. 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the 
parties, considered the admissible evidence proffered by the 
parties, and heard the oral arguments of counsel at a hearing 
held on March 4, 1991, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Third-Party 
Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. is granted, thereby dismissing 
the Third-Party Complaint of Salt Lake City with prejudice. 
The causes of action alleged in the Third-Party Complaint are 
barred by Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. S 
35-1-60 (1953), as amended, there being no clear and unequivocal 
waiver of the bar expressed in the construction Agreement between 
the parties requiring Projects to indemnify or defend Salt Lake 
City from or against allegations of Salt Lake City's own negli-
gence . 
2. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Salt 
Lake City Corporation is denied. 
3. That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor 
of Third-Party Defendant Projects and against Third-Party Plain-
tiff Salt Lake City Corporation. 
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(U 
DATED this ff *^day of March, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE KENNETH R^GTRUP 
/do tZ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this (p day of March, 1991, to: 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ned P. Siegfried, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BTJ11.10 
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AGREEMENT 
ir*- ^ jj! 
For 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the **> day of 
APP.1 j ,
 9 19B£> by and between SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the State of Utah, (hereinafter "CITY") and 
T^RotrrT^. (/HI tAArrPD _ _ 
(hereinafter MCONTRACTORM) whose address is: 507^. t^-rjzr ^ACXS+JDUTU 
WTINESSEIH: 
WHEREAS, the City intends to have completed and Contractor agrees to per-
form the work as set forth in the contract documents (hereinafter the 
work or the project) for Project No. 19-A-153-3, Airport Maintenance 
Facilities, Phase II; and 
WHEREAS, the contractor for the sum and under terms and conditions herein 
stated agrees to perform the work* 
N3W, IHERETOHEr the City and the Contractor for the consideration herein-
after provided, agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. SCOPE OF WORK. The Contractor agrees to furnish all labor, 
materials and equipment to complete the said work as required in the draw-
ings and specifications which are hereby made a part of this' contract by 
reference. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that all 
vork shall be performed as required in the drawings and specifications 
and shall be subject to inspection and approval of the City or its author-
ized representative. The relationship of the Contractor to the City here-
under is that of an independent contractor. 
ARTICLE 2. TIKE OF COMPLETION. The work under this Contract shall be 
commenced upon Notice to Proceed and shall be completed in accordance with the 
Contract Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3. 
ARTICLE 3. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. Time is the essence of this Contract. The 
Contractor agrees that for each and every day any portion of the work remains 
incomplete after the time herein fixed by the City or within such additional 
time as may have been allowed by written extension, the City shall deduct and 
retain out of the money which may be due or become due said Contractor, or 
Contractor shall pay to the City, the sum or sums indicated in the Contract 
Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3, for each and every calendar day the 
work remains incomplete after the date fixed therein for conpletion. Said sum 
is, in view of the difficulty of determining City's damages, hereby agreed 
upon, fixed and determined by the parties hereto as liquidated compensatory 
damages that the City will suffer by reason of the failure of the Contractor 
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to conplete the work within the time agreed upon, and such daily compensation 
shall apply to each portion of said work after the time herein agreed upon fo 
its completion. 
Permitting the Contractor to continue and finish the work or any part of 
it after the time fixed for its completion or after the date to which the 
time for conpletion may have been extended, shall in no way operate as a 
waiver on the part of the City of any of its rights under this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 4. CONTRACT SUM. The City agrees to pay and the Contractor agrees fa 
accept for full performance of .this Contract, the sum bid by the Contractor ii 
his Proposal (page P-l) • The contract sum also includes the cost of all 
bondsr insurance, permits and fees required herein and all charges, expenses 
or assessments of whatever kind or character. No claim for services furnishei 
by the Contractor not specifically provided for herein shall be honored by 
City. 
ARTICLE 5. PAYMENT. The City agrees to pay the Contractor from time to 
time as the work progresses, but not more than once each month after date 
of Notice to Proceed, and only upon written certification by the Engineer. 
Within 30 calendar days of the time the Deputy Director approves any partial 
payment, the City will prepare a check for payment. 
ARTICLE 6. PAYMENT FOR MATERIALS ON HAND. There shall be no payment for 
stored materials. Payment for materials shall be made only after the 
materials are incorporated into the project. 
ARTICLE 7. SALES TAXES. The City is exenpt from sales taxes on property 
sold directly to it. Therefore, the City reserves the right for any equip-
ment or materials (exceeding $500 in value) to be ordered by the Contractor1 
for use hereunder, to require that the City be billed directly by the 
supplier, after issuance of a City purchase order, at the Contractor's net 
cost less any applicable discounts. The City cost for such equipment or 
material less an amount equal to the sales tax which would otherwise be ap-
plicable, if any, shall be deducted from sums due the Contractor hereunder^ 
ARTICLE 8. IIOEBTEDNESS. Before final payment is made, the Contractor 
must submit evidence satisfactory to the City that all payrolls, material 
bills, subcontracts and all outstanding indebtedness in connection with the 
work have been paid or that arrangements have been made for their payment. 
Payment will be made without unnecessary delay after receipt of such evi-
dence as mentioned above and final acceptance of the work bv the Citv. 
ARTICLE 9. SCHEDULE OF WAGES. Deleted. 
ARTICLE 10. ADDITIONAL WORK. It is understood and agreed by the parties 
hereto that no money will be paid to the Contractor for any new or addi-
tional labor or materials furnished, as defined in Section GP 6.02, unless 
a new contract or a modification hereof for such additional materials or 
labor has been made in writing and executed by the City and Contractor. 
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The City specifically reserves the right to modify or amend this Contract 
and the total sum due hereunder, either by enlarging or restricting the 
scope of the work. 
ARTICLE li. ACXTKPTANCE. The- work will be inspected for acceptance by 
the Engineer within a reasonable time upon receipt of notice from
 %the 
Contractor that the work is complete and ready for inspection. 
ARTIOE 12. DISPUTES. 
a. Except as otherwise provided in this Contract, any dispute con-
cerning a question of fact arising under this Contract, which is 
not disposed of by written agreement shall be decided by the Director 
of Airports, who shall reduce his decision to writing, and mail or 
otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision 
of said* Director shall be final and conclusiva unless, within 30 
days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails 
or otherwise furnishes to said Director a written appeal. The 
decision of the Director or his duly authorized representa-
tive for the determination of such appeals, shall be final and 
conclusive. This provision shall not be pleaded in any suit in-
volving a question of fact arising under this Contract as limit-
ing juducial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by 
such official or his representative is alleged. Provided, how-
ever, that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless 
the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so .grossly 
erroneous as necessarily to inply bad faith or is not supported 
by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceed-
ing under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of the appeal. 
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor*shall 
proceed diligently with the performance of the Contract and in ac-
cordance with the Director's decision. 
b. This dispute clause does not preclude consideration of questions 
of law in connection with decisions provided for in Paragraph 
(a) above. However, nothing in this Contract shall be construed 
as making final the decision of the Director or his representative 
on a question of law. 
ARTICLE 13. DEFAULT AND RS4EDY. 
a. If the Contractor shall be adjudged bankrupt or make a general 
assignment for the benefits of creditors or if a receiver should 
be appointed on account of insolvency, or if the Contractor or 
any of his Subcontractors should violate any of the previsions 
of this Contract, the City may serve written notice upon the 
Contractor and the bonding company of its intention to terminate 
all or any part of the Contract; and unless within 10 days after 
the serving of such notice, such violation shall be corrected or 
cease, to the City's satisfaction, the City then may take over 
the work snd prosecute it to conpletion by Contract or by any 
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other method it may deem advisable and at the expense of the Con-
tractor. The Contractor and the bonding company shall be liable 
to the City for any excess cost occasioned* the City thereby. 
b. Waiver of any default shall not be deemed to be a waives of any 
subsequent default. Waiver of breach of any provision of this 
Agreement shall not be construed to be trodif ication of the terms 
of this Agreement, unless stated to be such in writing, signed 
by the City. 
c. The Contractor shall continue the performance of this Agreement 
to the extent not cancelled under the provisions of this clause. 
d. The rights and remedies of the City provided in this clause 
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights 
and remedies provided by law or under this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 14. CITY'S RIGHT TO WITHHOLD CERTAIN AMOUNTS AND MAKE APPLICATION 
TOKHHJF. The City may withhold from payment to the Contractor such an 
amount or amounts as, in its judgment, may be necessary to pay just claims 
against the Contractor or any Subcontractor for damages, labor and services 
rendered and materials furnished in and about the work. The City may apply 
any such withheld amounts on the payment of such claims in its discretion. 
In so doing, the City shall be deemed the agent of the Contractor and pay-
ments so made by the City shall be considered as a payment made under the 
Contract by the City to the Contractor and the City shall not be liable to 
the Contractor for any such payments made in good faith. 
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor agrees to at all times protect, 
indemnify, save hamless and defend the City, its agents and eirployees from 
any and all claims, demands, judgments, expenses, inclduing reasonable 
attorneyfs fees, and all other damages of every kind and nature made, ren-
dered or incurred by or in behalf of any person or persons whomsoever, in-
cluding the parties hereto and their employees, which may arise out of any 
act or failure to act, work or other activity related in any way to the 
project, by the said Contractor, its agents, subcontractors, materialmen 
or employees in the performance and execution of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 16. SUBCONTRACTOR OR SUPPLIER. No part of this Contract shall 
be sublet by the Contractor without the prior written approval of the City. 
The Contractor and the City for themselves, their heirs, successors, ex-
ecutors, and administrators, hereby agree to the full performance of the 
covenants herein contained. The Contractor also agrees to require in any 
subcontract it makes in connection herewith that the subcontractor shall 
be subject to all of the provisions and requirements of this Contract. 
ARTICLE 17. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS. This Agreement consists of the docu-
ments listed under Section 1.06 of the General Provisions attached, all 
of which are made a part hereof and none of which can be altered, except 
in writing signed' by both parties. 
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ARTICLE 18. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. The right is reserved to the 
owners of public utilities and franchises to enter upon the street or work-
site for the purpose of making repairs or changes of their property that 
may become necessary by the work. She City shall also have the privilege 
of entering upon the street or worksite for the purpose of repairing sewers, 
or making house-drain connections therewith, or repairing culverts, storm 
drains, water system repairs or adjustments and any and all other necessary 
city work. 
ARTICLE 19. CONTROLLING LAW. Tins Agreement shall be construed in accor-
ance with and enforced under the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITOESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day 
and year first above written. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
By //{J&i/juS L~? M i < / 
MAYOR 
ATTES 
^ i^^ ,^ 
CTIYTECORDER 
Captractor 
(Seal)— 
(W)UMcrEO (Seal) 
APPROVED 
APR 151986 
a t t RICOfiDEfi 
\JtOr, (%&&a&ST~ (Seal) 
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CITY ACKNCMLEDGMEirr 
STATE OF UIAH ) 
; ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before we and 
vfoo being by me duly sworn
 r did say that they are the MAYOR and CITY 
RECORDER, respectively, of SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION," and said persons 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing m 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
ACKNOWLEDCMENT FOR CORPORATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the *} day of A P R I L r l9£z* personally appeared 
before me P M > L UrrC-rrrrrr^o # w h o being by me duly sworn, 
did say that he i s the v/,rr - p a ^ m c r v r r of <Pg^\gr7*S t ) sff t ^ITED 
, and that the fofegoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of ^ p p (Dc^/s-re: 
~P>\/ > ^UL>^ # and said P M N drr^\\-_ ,1 F~Q 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
A&\JCM£(MJL 
residing in 
My Commission Expires: 
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